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Congress, Controlled Substances, and Physician-Assisted
Suicide — Elephants in Mouseholes
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v.
Oregon to reject the U.S. attorney general’s authority to prohibit physicians in Oregon from prescribing Schedule II drugs for their terminally ill
patients to commit suicide can seem paradoxical
and confusing.1 How is it that California cannot
permit the patients of physicians who recommend marijuana, a Schedule I drug, to possess
legally and use marijuana that they may need to
survive, but Oregon can legally permit physicians to prescribe Schedule II drugs and patients
to possess and use such drugs to end their lives?
The key to the answer lies in distinguishing
between the two classes of questions by which
the U.S. Supreme Court primarily decides cases:
is a statute consistent with the U.S. Constitution
— that is, is it “constitutional”? — and what does
a federal statute actually mean? The California
case was decided on the basis of the first question, and the Oregon case on the second. More
specifically, in the California case, Congress had
outlawed any use of marijuana by classifying it
under Schedule I, which includes drugs that
have “no currently acceptable medical use.” The
legal question was whether Congress had the
constitutional authority to make this classification under its Commerce Clause powers.2 The
Court determined that it did, concluding that
the Commerce Clause gave Congress the same
power to regulate marijuana grown at home for
personal, medically related uses as it had to regulate the amount of wheat a farmer grew on his
farm for personal consumption.3 The fact that a
physician would recommend or prescribe the
marijuana for medical purposes was found to
be irrelevant.2,3 In the Oregon case, the power
of Congress to regulate the use of drugs in the
practice of medicine is not at issue; Congress can
set national drug-prescribing rules. The question
is: how did Congress affect the authority of states
to set medical practice standards by enacting the
Controlled Substances Act in 1970, which places
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substances in one of five schedules on the basis
of their potential for abuse or dependence?

the contr olled sub s tance s ac t
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion of
the Court in Gonzales v. Oregon, which was decided by a six-to-three vote. The opinion begins:
“The question before us is whether the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) allows the United States
Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in physicianassisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law
permitting the procedure.”1 In 1997 the Court
had observed that “Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide.”4 The current case is not about the Oregon law itself but about whether Congress had
given the U.S. attorney general the authority to
nullify its effect.
The Oregon statute — the first and still the
only state law to authorize physicians to write
prescriptions for a lethal dose of drugs for patients who were terminally ill but mentally competent and who asked for such a prescription at
least twice — was adopted by ballot measure,
first in 1994 and again in 1997.5 In 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno was asked by a group of
senators to determine that prescribing drugs for
suicide was not a “legitimate medical practice,”
as required by the Controlled Substances Act, and
that writing such a prescription could therefore
result in the revocation of one’s registration certificate with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and federal criminal prosecution. Reno
refused, concluding that the Controlled Substances Act did not authorize her to “displace the states
as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state’s determination as to
what constitutes legitimate medical practice.”1
John Ashcroft, who as a senator had support-
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ed federal efforts to curtail physician-assisted
suicide, was appointed attorney general in 2001.
In November 2001 he issued an Interpretive Rule
that stated:
[A]ssisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical purpose” within the meaning of [existing regulations], and prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled
substances to assist suicide violates the
Controlled Substances Act. Such conduct by
a physician registered to dispense controlled
substances may “render his registration . . .
inconsistent with the public interest” and
[is] therefore subject to possible suspension or revocation . . . regardless of whether state law authorizes or permits such
conduct by practitioners or others and regardless of the condition of the person
whose suicide is assisted.6
Every prescription filled under the Oregon law
has included Schedule II drugs, and such drugs
cannot be legally prescribed without registration
with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Thus,
in practice, the Oregon law would be rendered
ineffective by the Ashcroft rule. Accordingly, a
lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court of
Oregon, and the court enjoined the enforcement
of the rule.7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that the
Ashcroft rule was invalid because, by making a
medical procedure authorized under Oregon law
a federal offense, the rule changed “the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government” without a clear congressional statement authorizing this change.8

s tat u tory interpre tation
As a general rule, courts permit officials in the
executive branch who are charged with administering specific statutes, such as the Controlled
Substances Act, to interpret their meaning. Courts
give “substantial deference” to these interpretations if the statute is ambiguous and Congress
has given the agency the authority to make regulations to enforce it.
How much deference did Attorney General
Ashcroft’s interpretation of the Controlled Substances Act deserve? The Court decided it didn’t
deserve much, for three basic reasons. First, the
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Court found as unpersuasive the government’s argument that the attorney general was really just
interpreting one of his own regulations, since the
regulation did “little more than restate the terms
of the statute itself,” and thus the attorney general
was actually interpreting the statute itself, not one
of his own regulations. Specifically, the Controlled
Substances Act requires that controlled substances be prescribed only for a “currently accepted
medical use” and that a “valid prescription” can
only be “issued for a legitimate medical purpose.”
The regulation uses terms that are substantially
identical, and the Court concluded that by simply
restating a statute, like a parrot, an agency gets no
“special authority to interpret its own words.”1
The second reason the Court gave for not
granting deference to the attorney general’s interpretation is that the Controlled Substances
Act is not ambiguous and Congress did not delegate the authority to the attorney general to interpret the act. One reason is that if the attorney
general really had the power to remove physicians from the Controlled Substances Act registry simply because he concluded that their
registrations were inconsistent with “the public interest,” the attorney general’s power would
be “extraordinary.” He would, for example, have
been given the power “to deregister a physician
simply because he deemed a controversial practice permitted by state law to have an illegitimate medical purpose” — not just the statutory
power to remove the registrations of physicians
who falsified their applications, were convicted
of a felony, or had their state medical licenses revoked. But, the Court concluded, nothing in the
Controlled Substances Act gives the attorney general the power to “define the substantive standards of medical practice. . . .”1 Instead, the
Court noted, it is the secretary of Health and Human Services who has authority under the Controlled Substances Act to set medical standards,
specifically those involving “the medical treatment of . . . narcotic addiction.”1
To support this conclusion, the Court referred
directly to an international treaty, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which the
United States had ratified. When it passed a statute to enforce the convention, Congress specifically stated that “nothing in the Convention
will interfere with the ethical practice of medicine as determined by [the secretary of Health
and Human Services] on the basis of a consen-
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sus of the view of the American medical and
scientific community.”1 The Court found that the
structure of the Controlled Substances Act is
the same as the structure of its law enforcing
the Convention and thus conveys an unwillingness on the part of Congress “to cede medical
judgments to an Executive official who lacks
medical expertise.”1 Congress has the constitutional power to delegate medical decision-making authority to the attorney general. But the
Court found that Congress did not do so because,
among other reasons, the judgments the attorney general claimed to have the legal authority
to make are “quintessentially medical judgments,”
“beyond his expertise and incongruous with the
statutory purposes and design.”1 Citing one of
its prior cases, the Court has adopted its central
metaphor to decide this case: “Congress, we have
held, does not alter the fundamental details of a
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary
provisions — it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”1

a legitimate medic al pr ac tice?
The final argument that the Court considered
was the attorney general’s claim that the Controlled Substances Act itself prohibits physicianassisted suicide with the use of controlled substances because this use of Schedule II drugs is
not a “legitimate medical practice.” In the California medical marijuana case, the Court concluded
that in enacting the Controlled Substances Act,
Congress sought to “conquer drug abuse and to
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in
controlled substances.”2 The Court had not previously had occasion, however, to determine “the
extent to which the CSA regulates medical practice beyond prohibiting a doctor from acting as
a drug ‘pusher’ instead of a physician.”1 The
Court had previously decided that the law prohibits the “large-scale overprescribing of methadone,” which is not consistent with accepted
medical practices,9 and in the California case
that Congress itself had expressly found that
marijuana had no accepted medical use.2
The Court ruled that, on the basis of its “text
and design,” the Controlled Substances Act cannot reasonably be read as prohibiting physicianassisted suicide. The Court reached this conclusion because “the statute manifests no intent to
regulate the practice of medicine generally” and
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because, under basic principles of federalism,
the states have “great latitude under their police
powers to legislate as to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”1 The Court concluded not only that the
practice of medicine is a state-regulated activity
and that Congress did not mean to make it federally regulated under the Controlled Substances
Act, but also that the Oregon law itself is a good
example of how states actually regulate the
practice of medicine:
Rather than simply decriminalizing assisted suicide, [the Oregon law] limits its exercise to the attending physicians of terminally ill patients, physicians who must be
licensed by Oregon’s Board of Medical
examiners. . . . The statute gives attending
physicians a central role, requiring them to
provide prognoses and prescriptions, give
information about palliative alternatives and
counseling, and ensure patients are competent and acting voluntarily. Any eligible patient must also get a second opinion from
another registered physician, and the statute’s safeguards require physicians to keep
and submit to inspection detailed records
of their actions.1
Nonetheless, the Court found as “at least reasonable” the attorney general’s contention that
physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical practice because it violates the position of
prominent medical organizations, the federal government, and 49 states.1 A “reasonable” interpretation of a statute on the part of the attorney general would be acceptable to the Court, but only
if the statute itself authorized the attorney general to interpret it. The Court decided that the
Controlled Substances Act did not allow this interpretation, because Congress did not authorize
the attorney general “to bar a use [of a controlled substance] simply because it may be inconsistent with one reasonable understanding
of medical practice.”1 Instead, the Court concluded that the attorney general’s powers under the
Controlled Substances Act consist only of restricting the prescribing practices of physicians
of drugs that have a potential for addiction or
recreational use. To “read prescriptions for assisted suicide as constituting ‘drug abuse’ under
the CSA is discordant with the phrase’s consis-
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tent use throughout the statute, not to mention
its ordinary meaning.”1 The Court ended the
opinion with a characterization of its ruling as a
“commonsense” one in that “the background
principles of our federal system . . . belie the
notion that Congress would use such an obscure
grant of authority to regulate areas traditionally
supervised by the States’ police powers.”1
States have traditionally licensed physicians
and regulated the practice of medicine. Federal
activity historically has been limited to regulating the manufacture and sale of drugs and devices and to controlling drug trafficking and recreational uses of drugs. Once a drug is approved
as “safe and effective” for any use, physicians are
able to exercise their medical judgment to prescribe it for any other use consistent with the
practice of medicine, as determined by state law
and actual medical practice. Ultimately, the Court
ruled, nothing Congress did when it enacted the
Controlled Substances Act changed the respective
roles of the states and the federal government.

jus tice sc alia’s dissent
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dissent, which
was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief
Justice John Roberts. Scalia would have deferred
to the attorney general’s interpretation of the
Controlled Substances Act. Scalia’s strongest argument, I think, is that Congress had set an objective federal standard of “legitimate medical
practice” when it enacted the Controlled Substances Act. Under this federal standard, it was (as the
majority of the Court conceded) “at least reasonable” (a phrase Scalia described as testing “the
limits of understatement”) for the attorney general to conclude, on the basis of the laws of 49
states and the federal government as well as basic standards of medical ethics, that assisting a
patient’s suicide is not a legitimate medical purpose of a drug prescription. Scalia argued that
the majority had confused “the normative inquiry
of what the boundaries of medicine should be —
which it is laudably hesitant to undertake — with
the objective inquiry of what the accepted definition of ‘medicine’ is.” Scalia continued, “The fact
that many in Oregon believe that the boundaries
of ‘legitimate medicine’ should be extended to include assisted suicide does not change the fact that
the overwhelming weight of authority . . . confirms that they have not yet been so extended.”1
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Scalia also rejected the notion that hiding “elephants in mouseholes” was an apt description
of congressional intent, noting that the attorney
general has attempted to regulate the uses of controlled substances outside the setting of addiction
and recreational use in only four areas: assisted
suicide, aggressive therapy of pain management,
the use of anabolic steroids, and cosmetic weightloss therapy. In none of these four areas, Scalia
argued, had the attorney general’s assertion of
power done anything to undermine the statutory
scheme.
Scalia found that all of the attorney general’s
actions were consistent with a reasonable interpretation of a “uniform federal standard for legitimacy of medical practice” in relation to the
prescription of drugs. Scalia closed his opinion
with an agreement with the majority that Congress can outlaw physician assisted-suicide if it
wants to:
Using the federal commerce power to prevent assisted suicide is unquestionably permissible. The question before us is not whether Congress can do this, or even whether
Congress should do this; but simply whether Congress has done this in the CSA. I think
there is no doubt that it has.1

the r ole of physicians
Like most judicial opinions devoted to the interpretation of a statute, this one is not all that monumental, and Congress can rewrite the statute if
it disagrees with the Court’s interpretation. Although the vote was six to three, the outcome of
the case was difficult to predict in advance. I have
never been all that enamored of the Oregon law,
and I continue to believe that Oregon’s approach
of providing physicians with immunity for the
prescription of drugs for suicide is flawed — both
because it undercuts medical professionalism by
making the prescription of drugs for terminally
ill patients who might be suicidal “much more
bureaucratic and burdensome, and less private
and accountable” and because it requires physicians specifically “to intend the deaths of their
patients.”10 Nonetheless, more than a decade after its enactment, in a contest between the seldom-used Oregon statute and a federal agency’s
assertion of power over all U.S. physicians’ pre-
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scriptions of scheduled drugs, it was not really
possible to root for the attorney general. Moreover, the DEA lately has seemed much more menacing to physicians than it had been, especially
since the agency withdrew its support for painprescribing guidelines that had been adopted by
the Federation of State Medical Boards.11,12 Quill
and Meier, for example, have argued that, had
the Court ruled the other way, “physicians may
become hesitant to prescribe the best available
medications to manage the pain, agitation, and
shortness of breath that sometimes accompany
the end stages of illness. As a result, they may,
in essence, abandon patients and their families
in their moment of greatest need.”13
To the extent that this prophecy might have
been correct, Gonzales v. Oregon should be a major
comfort to physicians, for two reasons. First,
the majority of the justices found great significance in the fact that the Oregon statute sets
procedures for physicians to follow and explicitly
trusts that they will follow them in the exercise
of medical judgment. Thus, the Court’s characterization, in the California medical marijuana
case, of some physicians as potential criminals
now seems limited to physicians involved in
drug trafficking of the type included in the Controlled Substances Act. Second, this opinion strictly
limits the jurisdiction of the DEA with regard to
physicians to those involved in drug trafficking.
Physicians who treat terminally ill patients or
patients with cancer at any stage of their illness
have never had much to fear from the DEA; now
they have nothing to fear from it. As Quill and
Meier might put it, to the extent that “for better
or worse, the DEA sets the tone and drives perceptions about legal risk associated with prescribing Schedule 2 drugs for seriously ill and
dying patients,”13 the tone should be nothing
but supportive of keeping patients free of pain
and discomfort.
Virtually anything that encourages what has
been termed “a palliative ethic of care”14 has
strong public support and is supported by the
Court as well. This attitude is probably why, although all nine justices agree that Congress has
the constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause to outlaw the prescription of controlled
substances for physician-assisted suicide at any
time, there has been no movement in Congress
to do so. The lack of Congressional reaction to
the opinion may also reflect the overwhelming
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condemnation on the part of the public of Congress’s attempt to interfere with the medical (and
legal) judgments about the treatment of Terri
Schiavo.14-16

national s tandard s
of medic al pr ac tice
Now that there is no longer any serious question
that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the practice of medicine, the issue of national medical licensure and
standards of medical practice may receive more
attention. The Court is certainly correct in noting that Congress historically has been loath to
legislate medical practice, preferring to see the
areas in which it has legislated — such as drug
trafficking, recreational drug use, female genital
mutilation, and even so-called partial-birth abortion — not as the practice of medicine at all, but
something outside of it. Nonetheless, there is
tension between the historical role of the state
in terms of licensing physicians and setting standards of medical practice and arguments in favor of national practice standards.
Medical schools are all substantially identical
in their training, and all their graduates must
pass the same national examinations. State licensure seems to be a relic in a country where actual
practice standards are set nationally and where
local variations of these standards are seen as
problems. Furthermore, Congress has acted to attempt to control medical practices that it has
viewed as intolerable. For example, it has acted
in the areas of medical research standards, in
order to protect human subjects, and emergency
treatment requirements in hospitals, in order to
protect patients with a medical emergency. The
question is not whether national practice standards for physicians and hospitals could be a good
thing; they could be. It has been persuasively suggested, for example, that the adoption of six patient-safety practices by U.S. hospitals could save
up to 100,000 lives in the first two years.17 The
question is, who will have the authority to set the
practice standards? It is one thing to decide that
national standards will be set by the relevant specialty boards or other national medical organizations on the basis of evidence that supports the
relevance of such standards to the health and
welfare of patients; it is quite another to say that
standards will be set by Congress or the attor-
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ney general on the basis of the political winds
of the day.
No potential conflict of interest relevant to this article was reported.
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CLINICAL TRIAL REGISTRATION

The Journal encourages investigators to register their clinical trials
in a public trials registry. The members of the International Committee
of Medical Journal Editors plan to consider clinical trials for publication
only if they have been registered (see N Engl J Med 2004;351:1250-1).
The National Library of Medicine’s www.clinicaltrials.gov is a free registry,
open to all investigators, that meets the committee’s requirements.
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